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ABSTRACT
We investigate the relationship between the effective tax rate
(E.T.R.) and company size in Germany to test tax planning–politi-
cal power versus political cost theories. In contrast to most stud-
ies in this field, which use linear approximations, this paper uses
a quantile regression approach. We use data from Compustat,
corresponding to non-financial listed companies during
1992–2009. The results indicate a nonlinear relation, with a posi-
tive sign for the first quantiles and a negative one in the last part
of the distribution. Additionally, leverage, inventory intensity and
return on assets are found to be significant determinants of
the E.T.R.
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Corporate income tax (C.I.T.) is a key and highly-debated component of the tax sys-
tems of developed countries. Although the revenue from C.I.T. is not a large propor-
tion of total tax revenue, this tax is very significant for a good number of companies
– taking into account payments and compliance costs – and may therefore have a sig-
nificant effect on certain corporate decisions. As governments are perfectly aware of
this situation, over recent decades several reforms of different degrees have been
applied to C.I.T. in most countries.1
These company tax reforms have been generally characterised by a reduction of
the statutory tax rate (S.T.R.) and a simultaneous enlargement of the tax base, with
the aim of simplifying the tax, maintaining revenues and reducing the gap between
the S.T.R. and the effective tax rate (E.T.R.). In this context, the E.T.R. differs from
S.T.R. in that the former attempts to measure taxes paid as a proportion of economic
income, while the latter indicates the amount of tax liability (before any credits) rela-
tive to taxable income, which is defined by the tax law and reflects tax benefits and
subsidies built into the law. A common measure of tax liability has been current tax
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expense with some variant of pre-tax income (United States Government
Accountability Office (U.S. G.A.O.), 2013), as we discuss in Section 3 below.
Nevertheless, despite this international trend in S.T.R.s, some countries maintain
relatively high rates, such as the U.S. or some European Union (E.U.) Member States
such as Belgium, Germany, France, Italy or Malta. In this paper we focus on
Germany, a leading world economy only smaller than those of the U.S., China and
Japan. In fact, within the E.U., Germany is the country with the largest absolute tax
revenues in terms of both aggregate tax revenue as well as C.I.T.
The last two important reforms of C.I.T. in Germany were implemented in 2000
and 2008. One of the highlights of these reforms, aside from other measures that we
will comment on below, was the reduction of the S.T.R.s. Concretely, in the 2000
reform the rate dropped from an average of 51 percent to 38.3 percent, while in 2008
this trend continued with a further reduction in the rate to 30.2 percent. Until 2008,
however, Germany had the highest S.T.R. in the E.U., except for the years 2001 and
2002, when Belgium and Italy had the highest rates.
C.I.T. has been analysed from several viewpoints in the literature in recent decades
(for a complete review on this topic, see the papers by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)
and Graham, Raedy and Shackelford (2012)), with two of the most prominent
research areas being tax competition (Devereux & Loretz, 2012), which analyses the
validity of the prediction of a ‘race to the bottom’ (Leibrecht & Hochgatterer, 2012)
or the mechanisms of tax interactions; and tax convergence, which studies the possible
convergence of corporate taxes (Slemrod, 2004). This paper, on the other hand,
belongs to the literature devoted to the determinants of corporate E.T.R.s, detailed in
Section 3. While there is a consensus or agreement in this literature regarding poten-
tial explanatory variables of corporate E.T.R.s as they are used in most studies,
namely size, debt, asset composition and profitability, the results are not conclusive: a
literature review can be found in Delgado, Fernandez-Rodrıguez and Martınez-Arias
(2014). This study focuses on firm size, but other variables are included in the esti-
mations. To conduct our study, we use a sample of German listed companies between
1992 and 2009 extracted from the Compustat database (www.spglobal.com).
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, the econometric methodology, based
on conditional quantile regression, has barely been used in this literature; see Hsieh
(2012) for the case of China and Delgado et al. (2014) for the E.U. This methodology
allows the evaluation of the relative importance of variables at different points of E.T.R.
distribution, thereby relaxing the commonly-used assumption of linearity. Secondly, to the
best of our knowledge there is only one previous paper on this topic devoted to the
German case (Kraft, 2014), so additional empirical evidence for Germany as a leading
European country is relevant. In contrast to Kraft (2014), who uses a linear approximation
to study the Corporate Tax Reform 2008 and the period 2005–2011, we employ quantile
regression for the period 1992–2009, including the two reforms (2000 and 2008).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a general overview
of corporate tax in Germany. In Section 3 we lay out the hypotheses, review the
empirical literature and describe the methodology. Section 4 presents the data and
main results. Finally, Section 5 contains a summary of our main conclusions and
some future lines of research.
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2. The German corporate income tax
The impact of corporate taxation on tax revenue, the attractiveness of the locations
and economic performance have been under debate in Germany for decades, and sev-
eral tax reforms have been implemented to address these impacts. In 2000 and 2008,
nominal tax rates were reduced and the tax base was broadened in accordance with
the ‘tax-cutting and base-broadening’ strategies that have been enforced in other
countries since the 1980s. In Figure 1 we represent the evolution of the S.T.R.s in dif-
ferent areas since the early 1990s using O.E.C.D. data (oecd.org).
Concretely, Figure 1 reflects the S.T.R. in Germany, the U.S., the U.K. and the
O.E.C.D. (both simple -sa- and weighted -wa- averages) over the period 1992–2012.
The graph reveals a downward trend in all these territories, with Germany under the
U.K. and the U.S., and the weighted O.E.C.D. average in the last years of the sample.
With data for the E.U. from Eurostat (ec.europa.eu/eurostat) (Table 1), it is pos-
sible to clearly distinguish a gap between the average rates of the E.U. and Germany.
In Germany, the S.T.R. was 58.2 percent in 1992 and 51.6 percent in 2000, after
which the nominal rate was established at 38.9 percent with the 2000 reform and fur-
ther reduced to 30.2 percent since 2008. Two decades ago, there was a difference of
21.8 points between the German and the E.U. S.T.R.. But after the 2000 reform this
gap decreased to less than 10 points, with the exception of 2005, due to a significant
reduction of the European average as eight countries diminished their rates. In short,
although it has been reduced in recent years, an important difference remains.
Despite these declines in the S.T.R.s, there was an increase in C.I.T. revenue in the
E.U. countries during the years up to the beginning of the Great Recession, as a per-
centage of both G.D.P. and total tax revenue. This paradoxical phenomenon can be
initially explained by the increase of the tax base. Some authors have, however, inter-
preted this result in other terms, such as an increase of the firms’ profitability, the ris-
ing weight of service sectors or the growth of the number of companies as opposed
Figure 1. Statutory corporate tax rates.
Note: corporate income tax rate: combined central and sub-central.
Source: O.E.C.D., Taxfoundation.org.
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to individual entrepreneurs (Auerbach, 2006; Devereux, Griffith & Klemm, 2004;
Mooij & Nicodeme, 2008; Sørensen, 2007).
In addition, the evolution of the S.T.R. itself may be a motive for the rise in collection.
This is due to the parabolic relationship between the tax rate and C.I.T. collection, as
pointed out by Clausing (2007), where an S.T.R. of 33 percent maximised the tax reve-
nues for the O.E.C.D. as a whole. This rate varies among countries depending on their
size and degree of trade openness, and will be lower for smaller countries and more open
economies. In this sense, Devereux (2007) concluded results similar to those of Clausing
(2007) for 20 countries in the period 1965–2004, with a rate of 30 percent. It should be
noted that the S.T.R.s in the E.U. are significantly lower than 33 percent, especially in the
EU-28 context. Figure 2 represents the evolution of the C.I.T. collection (as a percentage
of G.D.P.) and the S.T.R. in Germany (the coefficient of correlation between them is
0.228), where we can clearly observe the effect of the two reforms on collection.
Returning to the German case, companies are charged with three taxes on profits:
 Corporate income taxes (K€orperschaftsteuer);
 Trade tax (Gewerbesteuer);
 Solidarity surcharge (Solidarit€atszuschlag).
In 2000, the C.I.T. rates were reduced from 45 percent on non-distributed profits
and 30 percent on distributed profits to a common rate of 15 percent, with
Table 1. Adjusted top corporate statutory tax rates in the E.U.
1995 2000 2001 2005 2008 2012
Germany 56.8 51.6 38.3 38.7 30.2 30.2
E.U.-28 35.0 32.0 30.4 25.3 23.8 22.9
E.U.-17 36.8 34.4 33.0 28.1 26.3 25.4
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 2. Corporate income tax (C.I.T.) collection and statutory tax rate (S.T.R.) in Germany.
Source: O.E.C.D. and authors’ own work.
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accompanying measures to expand the tax base. In 2008, the so-called ‘interest barrier
rule’ introduced a profit-based limit on the deduction of interest expenses if net inter-
est expenditure exceeded e3,000,000; and a modified tax base rule added parts of the
interest expenditure, rents, leasing and license fees to the tax base.
The Municipal Trade Tax on business profits includes rates between 14 percent
and 17 percent, and is based on taxable income in C.I.T. with several adjustments.
Since 2008, the Trade Tax is no longer deductible.
Finally, a Solidarity Surcharge has been levied on corporate tax liability since the
German reunification, with a rate of 3.75 percent in 1991–1992, 7.5 percent in
1995–1997 and 5.5 percent since 1998. Hence, with the 15 percent C.I.T. rate, the 5.5
percent solidarity surcharge and the trade tax, the overall rate is about 30-33 percent.
The German tax reform of 2000 has been studied by Keen (2002), Sørensen (2002)
and Weber (2009), and the 2008 reform by Homburg (2007), Radulescu and
Stimmelmayr (2010) and Finke, Heckemeyer, Reister and Spengel (2013). The main
changes in both reforms are summarised below based on Sørensen (2002, p. 359) and
Radulescu and Stimmelmayr (2010, p. 462).
 Business Taxation Reform Act 2000:
 The tax rate on retained corporate income and the tax rate on distributed income
are reduced from 51.8 percent and 43.0 percent, respectively, to 38.6 percent;
 The top marginal personal tax rate on capital income is lowered from 53.8 percent
to 44.3 percent, and the basic marginal rate from 24.2 percent to 15.8 percent; the
rate of dividend withholding tax is also reduced from 25 percent to 20 percent;
 Reduction of depreciation allowances for movable assets from 30 percent to 20
percent, and for business buildings from 4 percent to 3 percent; official depre-
ciation rate tables are also to be based on more realistic useful life periods;
 Reform of the method of corporate-personal tax integration;
 Other reform measures (i.e., abolition of corporate income tax on capital gains
on a parent companys shares in a subsidiary).
 Business Taxation Reform Act 2008:
 Cutback of the corporate tax rate by 10 percentage points and a reduction of
the uniform trade tax measure from 5 percent to 3.5 percent;
 Counteract the tax shifting activities by multinational enterprises via intra-com-
pany loans;
 Abolition of accelerated depreciation for fixed assets;
 Limits the deduction of net-interest expenses for tax purposes to 30 percent of
the earnings before interest and taxes (E.B.I.T.);
 Other reform measures (i.e., any income from capital such as interest, divi-
dends and capital gains is subject to a final withholding tax of 25 percent plus
solidarity surcharge and church tax).
3. Hypothesis, empirical literature review and methodology
With the aim of investigating the relationship between the effective corporate tax
rates and firm size, we employ the following variables in an empirical study:
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 ETR: the dependent variable, defined as the ratio between current tax payments
and earnings before taxes;
 SIZE: size of the company, defined as the logarithm of the total assets;
 LEV: leverage, defined as the ratio between total debt and total assets;
 CAPINT: capital intensity, defined as the tangible assets as a proportion of
total assets;
 INVINT: inventory intensity, defined as the investment in inventories as a propor-
tion of total assets;
 ROA: return on assets, defined as the ratio between earnings before income taxes
and total assets.
In the literature on E.T.R.s there exists a wide range of definitions, and reviews are
provided by Nicodeme (2001) or, more recently, Gravelle (2014). The E.T.R. is taxes
paid divided by profits, and captures some of the tax benefits and subsidies that
reduce the tax paid per Euro of profit. This measure can make a country with a high
statutory tax rate but narrow base more comparable to a country with a low legal tax
rate and wide base. It is probably more appropriate to assess the true relative burden
on investment than the statutory tax rate. These tax rates may not, however, capture
temporal effects (for example, accelerated depreciation) and generally depend on
accounting rules that may vary across countries.
Nevertheless, in a time series framework such as ours, the temporal problem disap-
pears. On the other hand, the marginal effective tax rate is the appropriate measure
for determining the effects of tax rate differentials on investment. This is computed
as the ratio of the difference between pre-tax and post-tax returns to pre-tax return.
In some cases, however, marginal tax rates do not include all of the components of
investment, frequently being restricted to investment in fixed assets or fixed assets
and inventory. In addition, these tax rates depend on estimates of economic depreci-
ation, expected inflation and rates of return. A drawback of this rate is the estimation
procedure, which is not easy, and changes according to the fiscal context. As Bach
(2013) noted, the results reported for different studies show remarkable differences in
effective tax rates depending on the assumptions made about economic conditions
and other factors that influence the tax burden.
Another approach is the effective average tax rate (E.A.T.R.) (Devereux & Griffith,
1998, 2003), although ‘the implications of this tax rate, which combines statutory and
marginal effective rates, are not clear’ (Gravelle, 2014). This measure is highly rele-
vant for the analysis of the impact of the business tax system on tax revenues, since it
is closer to standard ‘backward looking’ measures of tax ratios, but these rates also
require simulations, with the problems these entail. According to Bach (2013, p. 11),
in the long run forward-looking and backward-looking measures should not diverge so
much as it seems to be the case in Germany. This questions the representativeness and
suitability of the forward-looking-measures, which are widely used for the analysis of
business taxation and its reform in Germany.
In addition, the choice of the definition depends on the aims of the research.
Following Nicodeme (2001), the methodology of the micro backward-looking
approach has two advantages: (1) it uses real-life data and allows all the elements of
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taxation to be taken into account; and (2) it makes it possible to study effective tax-
ation at a sectoral level and for different sizes. Moreover, it makes it possible to iden-
tify the items of the balance sheet that have a significant influence on effective
corporate taxation. The aim of this research is to analyse the relationship between the
E.T.R.s and firm size, and we therefore believe that the most suitable rate is that cal-
culated from the microdata of the annual accounts of our sample (Compustat).
Regarding the expected signs for the explanatory variables, we summarise the the-
oretical arguments in the following hypothesis. Our underlying assumption is that
most relationships, including the principle one between size and E.T.R., are nonlinear,
so that there may be different patterns along the firms’ distribution.
3.1 Main hypothesis
 Hypothesis 1: SIZE and ETR are non-linearly related.
Firm size is the most widely-used variable in previous research on the corporate tax
burden for two contrasting reasons. First, the political cost hypothesis (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978) predicts a positive relationship between
size and E.T.R. due to the largest firms having greater taxation because of greater gov-
ernment control. In addition, the largest firms tend to be more exposed and monitored
by the markets, which would lead them to pay more taxes to give a good image.
Secondly, in contrast, the political power hypothesis (Siegfried, 1972) predicts a nega-
tive relationship due to the largest companies having a greater influence on the regula-
tors to reduce their tax rates. In addition, the largest firms will have greater scope for
tax planning or the adoption of accounting practices that diminish their E.T.R.s.
Therefore, from a theoretical perspective, the relationship between size and E.T.R. is
undetermined. Since Zimmerman (1983), who found a positive relationship between
size and E.T.R., and Porcano (1986), who concluded a negative relation, the abundant
empirical research carried out for different geographical areas and temporal intervals is
not conclusive about the prevalence of one of these hypotheses. It is possible that the
diversity of results achieved in the existing literature is a consequence because, through-
out the distribution of the sample and for different size levels, the relationships are
altered. For this reason, the present study contrasts the possible non-linear relationship
between size and E.T.R. for German companies by quantile regression.
3.2 Other hypotheses
 Hypothesis 2: LEV and ETR are non-linearly related.
The relation may be positive for companies with high effective tax rates, while from
the traditional perspective – deductibility of interest payments – it would be negative.
 Hypothesis 3: CAPINT and ETR are non-linearly related.
The relation may be positive because firms with low capital intensity and high
effective tax rates can be induced to increase their noncurrent assets to diminish the
tax rates through depreciation and investment tax credits. As companies with high
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fixed assets should face a lower fiscal burden than those with low fixed assets due to
the deductibility of depreciation and fiscal credits for noncurrent assets, however, the
relation could also be negative.
 Hypothesis 4: INVINT and ETR are positively related.
An investment in inventories is considered to be an alternative employment of
funds to noncurrent assets and consequently limits the possibilities of reducing the
managerial E.T.R..
 Hypothesis 5: R.O.A. and ETR are non-linearly related.
A priori, profitable firms would be expected to have a higher tax burden, and
hence the expected sign is positive. On the other hand, however, these firms may
have more tax planning instruments and clear incentives to diminish the effect-
ive taxation.
Theoretically, therefore, SIZE, LEV, CAPINT and R.O.A. can be related both posi-
tively and negatively with E.T.R., whereas INVINT is expected to be positively related
to the effective tax rates.
Additionally, we have included dummies by years and sectors. To define sec-
tors we use the Standard Industrial Classification (S.I.C.), dropping the financial
sector (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate) and disaggregating the manufacturing
and services sectors according to the two-digit S.I.C. codes due to the large num-
ber of companies dedicated to these activities. More concretely, we have consid-
ered the following main sectors (sectors with a sufficient number of observations
are considered): Manufacturing I; Manufacturing II; Transportation,
Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services; Wholesale Trade; Retail
Trade; Services I; Services II; Others (Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing; Mining;
Construction; Nonclassifiable Establishments).
In line with the theoretical arguments described in Hypothesis 1, the empirical evi-
dence on the relationship between size and E.T.R. is ambiguous. The results achieved
in the empirical literature are not conclusive as pointed out by Belz, von Hagen and
Steffens (2018) in their meta-analysis: they review 49 studies, with 20 in favour of the
political cost theory, nine in line with the political power theory, nine with no signifi-
cant results and 11 supporting both theories. For example, in agreement with the pol-
itical costs hypothesis, Zimmerman (1983), Wang (1991), Omer, Molloy and Ziebart
(1993), Plesko (2003), Calve-Perez, Labatut-Serer and Molina-Llopis (2005), Noor,
Syazwani and Mastuki (2010) and Kraft (2014) find a positive relation between E.T.R.
and size. On the other hand, Porcano (1986), Kim and Limpaphayom (1998),
Derashid and Zhang (2003), Harris and Feeny (2003), Janssen (2005), Richardson and
Lanis (2007) and Chen et al. (2010) find a negative relation between them. Finally,
several studies find no significant relation between size and E.T.R., including Stickney
and McGee (1982), Gupta and Newberry (1997), Wilkinson, Cahan and Jones (2001),
Fernandez-Rodrıguez (2004), Feeny, Gillman and Harris (2006) and Liu and
Cao (2007).
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Recently, however, Fernandez-Rodrıguez and Martınez-Arias (2011), for the U.S.
using fixed effects and random effects models; Fonseca-Dıaz, Fernandez-Rodrıguez
and Martınez-Arias (2011), for Spain through the generalised method of moments
(GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for dynamic panel data;
Hsieh (2012), for China using ordinary least squares (O.L.S.) and quantile regression;
Delgado, Fernandez-Rodrıguez and Martınez-Arias (2012), for the U.S. through a
fixed effects model; and Delgado et al. (2014) for the E.U. using quantile regression,
found a nonlinear relationship between size and E.T.R.. Additionally, Wu et al.
(2012) find both positive and negative relationships for China depending on the sub-
sample used. These results highlight the need to handle this relationship using tools
other than simple linear models. One of these tools is the quantile regression
approach used in this research.
With the purpose of studying heterogeneous behaviour at different levels of the
dependent variable, E.T.R., this semiparametric approximation, proposed initially by
Koenker and Basset (1978) (more details on quantile regression can be found in
Buchinsky (1998) and Koenker & Hallock (2001)), minimises the deviations in abso-
lute value with asymmetric weighting instead of minimising the squares of the errors
as in O.L.S. In this manner, the quantile regression is described as
yi ¼ x0ibh þ uhi
Quanth yijxi
  ¼ inf y : Fi yjx   h  ¼ x0ibh
Quanth uhijxið Þ ¼ 0
where Quanth (yijxi) denotes the conditional quantile of yi on the vector xi. Hence







hjyi  xibj þ
X
i:yi<xib
1 hð Þjyi  xibj
 
In the quantile regression approach, with the 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9 quantiles
considered in this paper, the estimated marginal effects from the estimates of b would
indicate how the 10 percent, 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 percent and 90 percent condi-
tional quantiles would be affected at all x values. Methodologically, the quantile
regression estimator can be more efficient than O.L.S. if errors deviate from normal-
ity and the quantile estimators are less sensitive to outliers.
Finally, we perform a symmetry test for the quantiles. The null hypothesis is that
the effect of the variable is the same at the symmetric percentiles (0.25 and 0.75, 0.10
and 0.90 and so on).
4. Data and results
The data were obtained from the Compustat database and comprise non-financial
listed companies in Germany during the period 1992–2009, with a total of 4356
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observations. The estimations have been obtained with Stata software (www.stata.
com), and they have been replicated with two dummy variables corresponding to the
two reforms in 2000 and 2008. The results, practically the same, are available upon
request. In addition, although the manuscript only contains the results for 0.10, 0.25,
0.50, 0.75 and 0.90, for the sake of brevity, the more detailed results for the deciles
and vigintiles are also available upon request.
Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics and Table 3 contains the correlations
matrix. The average E.T.R. for 1992–2009 was 35.73 percent, far below the statutory
rates during this period, which had a mean of 46.04 percent. Regarding the correla-
tions matrix, it should be noted that it only reflects linear correlations and does not
take into account possible nonlinear relations, as we find in the quantile results.
The main results are summarised in Table 4 and represented in Figures 3–7 and
Tables 5–9 (O.L.S., quantile estimation and its confidence interval, minimum and
maximum). As a general observation, the estimations are in line with the theoretical
arguments described in the hypotheses above. There is no simple linear relation
between some of the variables and the E.T.R.s, so the quantile regression is appropri-
ate in order to correctly capture the nonlinearities in the data. Thus, O.L.S. does not
provide a good fit for the observations due to the inappropriateness of the linearity
assumption. In the benchmark case of the O.L.S. estimations, only the leverage and
the return on assets are significant. The estimated coefficient on leverage is positive
while that on return to assets is negative.
The results from the quantile regression permit a more detailed analysis of the
determinants of S.T.R.s. Whereas in the O.L.S. estimations the size parameter is posi-
tive but not significant (and thus in line with the papers with no evidence of a con-
crete theory described previously), in the quantile regression the size is a significant
variable and its sign varies from positive in the first part of the distribution to nega-
tive from the 0.5 quantile onwards, confirming the hypothesis of a non-linear rela-
tionship between the variables. In addition, the symmetry test confirms that the
effects are not the same at the percentiles. Thus, the predictions from the
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations.
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
ETR 0.3573 0.183 0.000 1.000
SIZE 5.7117 2.204 2.674 12.685
LEV 0.5749 0.194 0.009 1.000
CAPINT 0.2498 0.189 0.000 0.939
INVINT 0.1588 0.134 0.000 0.888
R.O.A. 0.0889 0.089 0.000 2.053
Source: Compustat and the authors’ own work.
Table 3. Correlations matrix.
ETR SIZE LEV CAPINT INVINT R.O.A.
ETR 1.000
SIZE 0.068 1.000
LEV 0.116 0.345 1.000
CAPINT 0.079 0.221 0.305 1.000
INVINT 0.056 0.007 0.129 0.047 1.000
R.O.A. 0.099 0.213 0.237 0.164 0.029 1.000
Source: Compustat and the authors’ own work.
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political cost theory prevail over the lower part of the distribution, but then the tax
planning–political power theory is confirmed over the higher parts.
This result is in line with Bao and Romeo (2013), where they concluded that there
was evidence of the political cost theory for the entire sample of firms, but of the
Table 4. Quantile regressions results.
Variable O.L.S.
Quantiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
SIZE 0.00190 0.02591 0.01738 0.00234 0.00808 0.01846
(0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0025)
LEV 0.04783 0.04759 0.07638 0.03550 0.09123 0.23411
(0.0156) (0.0254) (0.0245) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0292)
CAPINT 0.00455 0.01533 0.01294 0.01376 0.00312 0.02853
(0.0161) (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0271)
INVINT 0.00156 0.14768 0.11476 0.01080 0.04979 0.18464
(0.0250) (0.0436) (0.0399) (0.0195) (0.0189) (0.0421)
R.O.A. 0.15394 0.04403 0.13594 0.00368 0.20967 0.39489
(0.0310) (0.0673) (0.0567) (0.0243) (0.0275) (0.0961)
SECTOR1 0.02969 0.01528 0.01522 0.04445 0.03225 0.07181
(0.0278) (0.0387) (0.0401) (0.0215) (0.0221) (0.0484)
SECTOR2 0.02587 0.00674 0.02130 0.03828 0.02413 0.05884
(0.0276) (0.0384) (0.0396) (0.0213) (0.0220) (0.0480)
SECTOR3 0.03565 0.03562 0.00673 0.03976 0.04507 0.06806
(0.0286) (0.0396) (0.0412) (0.0221) (0.0226) (0.0492)
SECTOR4 0.05618 0.01151 0.04050 0.05784 0.04246 0.08710
(0.0303) (0.0422) (0.0433) (0.0235) (0.0243) (0.0529)
SECTOR5 0.03986 0.02431 0.03973 0.05784 0.04711 0.09280
(0.0305) (0.0429) (0.0441) (0.0237) (0.0242) (0.0527)
SECTOR6 0.03305 0.00516 0.01443 0.03690 0.03650 0.06464
(0.0280) (0.0393) (0.0403) (0.0217) (0.0221) (0.0482)
SECTOR7 0.00466 0.01122 0.00743 0.01005 0.00003 0.03746
(0.0298) (0.0420) (0.0431) (0.0231) (0.0235) (0.0509)
Source: authors’ own work. Standard errors in parentheses. , ,  denotes statistical significance at the 1 per-
cent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Figure 3. Quantile regressions results: size.
Source: authors’ own work.
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political power theory for the largest 5 percent of firms for the U.S. Our results are
also in accordance with Fernandez-Rodrıguez and Martınez-Arias (2011) for the U.S.
and EU-9; and Delgado et al. (2012) for the U.S.. Following the quantile regression
approach, Hsieh (2012), for China, finds non-significant some deciles, concretely the
first ones and the last one, showing that for most there was a negative sign. This
author states that their empirical results for the quantile regression show that not all
large firms may enjoy political power. On the other hand, and also using quantile
regression, Delgado et al. (2014), for the E.U., find a positive relationship in all dec-
iles, though in an unequal way along the sample. In particular, they find that the
Figure 5. Quantile regressions results: capital intensity.
Source: authors’ own work.
Figure 4. Quantile regressions results: leverage.
Source: authors’ own work.
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Figure 6. Quantile regressions results: investment in inventories.
Source: authors’ own work.
Figure 7. Quantile regressions results: R.O.A.
Source: authors’ own work.







Source: authors’ own work.
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coefficient falls as they move along the E.T.R., taking higher values for the first quan-
tiles of the distribution and then remaining practically constant for the latter deciles.
The leverage of the companies is significant in all quantiles and the pattern is con-
trary in the case of size, changing from negative to positive after the 0.5 quantile. The
symmetry test concludes that there are significant differences between the percentiles.
Fernandez-Rodrıguez and Martınez-Arias (2011), for the U.S. and the E.U.; and
Delgado et al. (2012), for the U.S., found also a non-linear relationship between lever-
age and E.T.R., although with contrary signs, while Hsieh (2012), for China, obtained
a positive sign for the first half of the deciles and non-significant for the rest. In a
previous study, Dwenger and Steiner (2014) estimated the impact of profit taxation
on the financial leverage of German corporations in 1998–2001 using the marginal
tax rate, finding a large positive effect on firm leverage (0.7 percent).
Capital intensity, on the other hand, is not significant in our quantile estimations,
as occurred with O.L.S.. Accordingly, the symmetry test does not conclude that there







Source: authors’ own work.







Source: authors’ own work.
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Source: authors’ own work.
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are differences in the estimates. Fernandez-Rodrıguez and Martınez-Arias (2011), for
the U.S., and Delgado et al. (2014), for the E.U., found a positive relation between
capital intensity and E.T.R. for some deciles and non-significant results for the others.
In addition, Fernandez-Rodrıguez and Martınez-Arias (2011), for the E.U., and
Delgado et al. (2012), for the U.S. found a non-linear relationship, positive until a
certain size and then negative. By contrast, Hsieh (2012), for China, obtained a nega-
tive sign in all deciles, with more sensitivity of E.T.R. to capital intensity across the
major quantiles of the distribution.
Investment in inventories was not significant in the O.L.S. estimations. The quantile
regression results shed some light on the reason for this, however, as it is significant
and positive for the first quantiles, non-significant for the intermediate ones, and nega-
tive and significant for the last quantiles. The effects of the investment in inventories
are different at the percentiles according to the symmetry test. No previous study finds
a sign change in the relationship between inventories’ intensity and E.T.R., although
Hsieh (2012), for China, and Delgado et al. (2014), for the E.U., point out a positive
relation for some deciles of the distribution, revealing the estimations for different
effects of inventories intensity on the E.T.R. depending of the decile.
Finally, the hypothesis of a non-linear relation between R.O.A. and E.T.R. was sup-
ported by the results. Concretely, the estimated parameter is positive and significant
for the 0.25 quantile but it becomes negative and significant for the 0.75 and 0.9
quantiles. The symmetry test confirms the existence of significant differences between
the effects at the percentiles. It should be noted that this is the first study that finds a
sign change in the relationship between profitability and E.T.R.. Only Hsieh (2012),
for China, and Delgado et al. (2014), for the E.U., obtained differences by deciles, but
in all cases the estimations were positive. Additionally, most of the previous literature
evidences positive relationships between R.O.A. and E.T.R.. Huang, Chen and Gao
(2013) found a negative relation for Chinese companies, however, and the same was
achieved for Malaysia by Derashid and Zhang (2003), Noor, Mastuki and Bardai
(2008) and Noor, Syazwani and Mastuki (2010). The reason behind this result is
almost certainly due to tax planning to reduce the tax burden.
5. Conclusions
German corporate tax has been reformed several times in recent decades, with the
last two reforms taking place in 2000 and 2008. The observed overall trend consisted
of a decline of the S.T.R. and an enlargement of the tax base, ensuring the mainten-
ance of, or even an increase in, tax revenues in most years despite the financial crisis.
In this paper we have studied the determinants of the effective corporate tax rates
in Germany over the last two decades, focusing on company size. As both the theor-
etical arguments as well as the existing empirical evidence for other countries are
ambiguous regarding the signs of company size and some other determinants of
effective tax rates, and in order to capture possible nonlinearities in the data, we use
a quantile regression approach.
Regarding the effect of company size on effective corporate tax rates, our results
show that, while the linear model does not reflect any significant relationship, the
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quantile regression reveals interesting results. In particular, size is now a significant
variable, and the predictions from the political cost theory (positive relation between
size and effective tax rates) prevail first; but then the tax planning and political power
theories (negative relation) become relevant from the 0.5 quantile onwards. With
regard to the other potential determinants of the E.T.R.s, leverage is significant in all
quantiles with the sign of the relationship also changing, going from negative to posi-
tive. Inventory also has a nonlinear relationship with E.T.R.s. The R.O.A. is signifi-
cant and negative for the last quantiles, indicating greater tax planning.
This is the first study of this type devoted to the German case, and overall our
results corroborate the main assumption of the paper, which is that the nonlinearities
frequently observed in the data call for the use of techniques other than O.L.S.. As
extensions of this research, at least two directions should be highlighted: first, it
would be interesting to perform the analysis with microdata from tax statistics,
though governments are generally unwilling to provide this detailed information for a
long time series; secondly, different nonlinear approaches could be applied such as,
for example, artificial neural networks.
Notes
1. See Dyreng et al. (2017) for a recent complete review of the evolution of the C.I.T. in
recent decades.
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